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Abstract 
 
 
ME/CFS (chronic fatigue syndrome) is a debilitating illness for which no cause or medical 
tests have been identified. Debates over its nature have generated interest from qualitative 
researchers.  However, participants are difficult to recruit because of the nature of their 
condition.  Therefore, this study explores the utility of the internet as a means of eliciting 
accounts.  We analyse data from focus groups and the internet in order to ascertain the extent 
to which previous research findings apply to the internet domain. Interviews were conducted 
among 49 members of internet (38 chatline, 11 personal) and 7 members of two face-to-face 
support groups.  Discourse analysis of descriptions and accounts of ME/CFS revealed similar 
devices and interactional concerns in both internet and face-to-face communication.  
Participants constructed their condition as serious, enigmatic and not psychological.  These 
functioned to deflect problematic assumptions about ME/CFS and to manage their 
accountability for the illness and its effects.   
 
 
Key words: ME/CFS; discursive psychology; illness descriptions; computer mediated 
communication, CMC 
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Introduction  
ME (Myalgic Encephalomyelitis) is the preferred term among UK sufferers for a condition 
clinically referred to as Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS).  This illness affects between 
110,000 and 150,000 people per annum in the UK (Cooper, 1997; Levine, 1997).  It is often 
highly debilitating and yet it remains a controversial and problematic illness for both 
clinicians and patients.  This is in part because, despite extensive investigation, no clear cause 
has been established (Fukuda et al, 1994; Wessely, Hotopf and Sharpe, 1998), and no 
unambiguous diagnostic medical tests identified. Instead, ME/CFS is diagnosed on the basis 
of reported symptoms, and these can vary in nature and in intensity from one person to 
another.  They may include reports of persisting or relapsing fatigue lasting 6 months or more; 
sore throat; tender lymph nodes; joint and muscle pain; headaches; post-exertion malaise; 
sleep disorder; and impaired memory or concentration (Fukuda et al, 1994; Holmes et al, 
1988; Schluederberg et al, 1992; Sharpe et al, 1991). 
 
Due to the uncertainty surrounding the causes and ‘objective’ diagnosis of ME/CFS, there 
have been debates over the extent to which psychological or psychiatric problems contribute 
to this condition (for example, in official statements about this illness:  Campion, 1988; 
Horton, 1996; Royal College of Physicians, 1996).  At the same time, the medical account of 
the illness has been challenged by patient organisations such as the ME/CFS Alliance (Banks 
and Prior, 2001) in favour of their own experience-based explanations (for brief summaries of 
these controversies, see Horton-Salway, 2001; Tucker, 2004). 
 
The contested nature of ME/CFS has also generated interest from qualitative researchers 
interested in the effects of this uncertainty.  Three issues in particular have been pursued:  
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(i) variability in the meaning and construction of ME/CFS; (ii) warranting knowledge claims 
about ME/CFS; and (iii) dealing with the implication that sufferers may have a psychological 
rather than physical illness.   
 
In relation to the first issue, Bülow and Hydén (2003) identified at least three ‘interpretative 
frameworks’ that were used often simultaneously by patients, nurses and physicians in the 
patient school they studied.  These included biomedical, biopsychosocial and non-medical or 
everyday explanations of the illness.  Banks and Prior (2001) noted the use of similar 
accounts of the illness in their study of medical consultations.  Their concern however was 
more specifically with the conflict between lay (biomedical) versus professional 
(biopsychosocial) accounts.  They argued that consultations can become almost a political 
contest as different parties seek to define the ‘true’ nature of the disorder.   
 
Horton-Salway (2004) however questioned the implied distinction between lay and expert 
knowledge because it rests on the assumption that there are discrete and identifiable forms of 
knowledge. She argued that ‘it should be the local production of expertise and experience and 
the legitimacy of related claims that is the focus of interest’ (op cit: 354).  Thus, Horton-
Salway’s (2004) analysis focused on the second issue, that is, how a clinical psychologist and 
sufferers establish their entitlement to make authoritative claims about ME.  She showed that 
they do so in part by making relevant their membership of particular categories (as, 
respectively, expert in psychological intervention and as sufferers with a wealth of 
experience).  She showed how expertise and experience were treated as forms of knowledge 
that added credibility to a speaker’s account or undermined others’ accounts.  Similarly 
Tucker (2004) examined how sufferers constructed CFS/ME as a knowable, legitimate illness 
by drawing a contrast between a specialist doctor who can produce a correct diagnosis and 
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‘ordinary’ GPs who lack knowledge of and therefore the ability to recognize ME/CFS in 
sufferers.   
 
Other work has examined how participants employ conversational strategies such as the use 
of medical terms and corroborative evidence (Horton-Salway, 2001; Tucker, 2004) to 
establish the factual status of their claims that ME/CFS is a physical and therefore legitimate 
illness.  In addition, Bülow and Hydén (Bülow, 2004; Bülow and Hydén, 2003) show how 
sufferers deal with the problem of legitimacy by co-constructing consensual views (e.g. in 
support groups) against which personal experience is compared. In this way, the group 
experience is used to validate individuals’ experiences. 
 
A third issue concerns the inferential consequences of the questioned legitimacy of ME/CFS, 
in particular, the idea that it is primarily psychological (i.e. related to depression, anxiety and 
psychiatric illness) (Banks and Prior, 2001; Horton-Salway, 2004) and therefore not real 
(Banks and Prior, 2001).  For example, it may be inferred that sufferers are simply 
malingering (Horton-Salway, 2001) or they may be stigmatized because it is more socially 
acceptable to suffer physical illness (Tucker, 2004).  All of these assumptions have negative 
implications for the kind of person one is taken to be, and they therefore constitute a threat to 
identity.  The third strand of work has therefore focused on how sufferers deal with these 
problematic inferences.  Some of these identity problems are dealt with through establishing 
the legitimacy and veracity of ME/CFS (as above).  However, sufferers may also produce 
attributions for the onset of the illness (e.g. catching ‘flu) which simultaneously attend to their 
accountability for having it (Tucker, 2004; see also Horton-Salway, 2001).  They also address 
negative identities directly, for example by constructing themselves as previously very active, 
thereby deflecting the possible inference that they are lazy or depressed (Horton-Salway, 
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2001).  Finally, Banks and Prior (2001) show how physicians may be sensitive to these 
problems and deal with them by ‘by-pass[ing] psychological language’ (op cit: 20) and using 
instead the vocabulary of brain chemicals (such as serotonin) which in turn opens the 
possibility of prescribing anti-depressants without talk of depression.   
 
Previous studies have revealed some of the ways in which the talk of clinicians and sufferers 
is sensitive to a number of interactional and inferential issues. The data has been derived from 
face-to-face interaction in interviews (Bülow, 2004; Bülow and Hydén, 2003; Horton-Salway, 
2001; Tucker, 2004) and recordings of meetings among members of a support group (Horton-
Salway, 2004) or patient school (Bülow, 2004; Bülow and Hydén, 2003).  However, none of 
the previous studies in this area have attended to the way in which the internet provides a 
domain for interactions and support among sufferers. Yet, internet communication offers a 
valuable resource for ME sufferers, as for others who are chronically ill (Hardy, 1999) or who 
have incapacitating physical or speech difficulties (Bowker & Tuffin, 2004). It is therefore 
imperative that researchers engage with these new forms of communication especially in 
regard to this client group.  Moreover, recent years have seen a growth in internet mediated 
support groups and there is evidence that the use of the internet for purposes of this sort in 
likely to increase (Nettleton and Burrows, 2003).   
 
This study therefore recruited participants from an internet support site.  There are, moreover, 
further benefits to be derived from the use of the internet as a medium for conducting research 
in this area.  First, it is worthwhile noting that a number of previous studies of this sufferer 
group have engaged with relatively small participant samples. An added advantage of 
attending to the rise of internet-based communication is that researchers in this area are given 
greater opportunities to recruit from a wider range of participants.  Second, it has the 
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advantage of enabling participants to respond where and when they feel most comfortable and 
rested, and to break off and resume the interview as necessary.  Similar advantages have been 
described for telephone interviewing (Clarke and James, 2003). 
 
Thus, it seems that the internet is a useful medium for research but we first need to ask how it 
relates to the kind of talk generated in face-to-face communication that has been the data of 
previous research.  In other words, we need to address the extent to which findings from 
previous research carry over into the internet domain and computer-mediated communication 
(CMC).  In particular, previous researchers’ interests have been in understanding the 
attributional and inferential properties of ME talk.  It is therefore crucial to understand the 
extent to which their findings, which relate to face-to-face interaction, are relevant to 
sufferers’ ‘talk’ on the internet.  It is to this novel enterprise that this current paper is 
addressed. 
 
In addressing these concerns, it is useful to note that researchers in other areas have already 
demonstrated the ways in which CMC reflects properties which are similar to spoken 
communication. Yates (2001) found that the range of vocabulary used in CMC resembled oral 
vocabulary rather than written communication in terms of the more limited variance in words 
used.  Fernback (2003) also concluded that CMC is a site of oral culture although one that 
undoubtedly possesses print characteristics.  Other work has addressed the functional 
properties of CMC language use.  For example, Antaki and colleagues (2005) and Lamerichs 
and te Molder (2003) show how internet users, like participants in conversation, attend to 
issues of accountability in postings. These studies call into question the assumption of earlier 
research, that CMC is an impoverished or somehow different form of communication (e.g. 
Rutter, 1984; Short, Williams and Christie, 1976).  Therefore, we cannot assume a priori that 
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CMC changes human interaction in specific ways, or that the influence is only in one 
direction; instead, this must be an empirical issue (Hutchby (2001a, 2001b).  It is therefore 
important that we collect data from both face-to-face and internet sources. 
 
The present study 
In this study, sufferers’ accounts of having ME/CFS were collected through the internet and 
face-to-face discussion groups. Our aim was to examine in detail how sufferers’ descriptions 
are constructed and, if relevant, to identify the kinds of interactional and inferential issues that 
inform their production. The focus, on participants’ constructions of ME, was designed to 
ensure that our findings would be comparable to those of previous studies.   
 
Like previous studies, we assume that descriptions are not neutral accounts of some aspect of 
the way the world is which can be assessed for their accuracy.  After all, phenomena may be 
described in many different but equally plausible ways.  We therefore take it that people can 
and do use descriptions to perform actions (Potter, 1996), and that the action-orientation of 
descriptions is achieved through the ways they are constructed (e.g. through the use of 
particular words or phrases).  Moreover, they are usually produced in an interpersonal context 
and, given this, there is always the possibility that descriptions may be greeted with 
scepticism (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998).  For example, they may be treated as a product of 
the person’s own interests, desires or ambitions, and discounted on this basis as interested 
rather than neutral (Edwards and Potter, 1992).  Descriptions are therefore often designed to 
deal with such difficult inferential issues.  Therefore, our analysis will attend to questions of 
‘how?’ and ‘what for?’ in participants’ constructions of ME. 
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Method 
Data and participants 
A total of 56 sufferers took part in this study.  Data were collected from two sources: face-to-
face group (FG) discussions and internet (email) communication with members of ME 
support groups. The discussion groups, which involved open-ended questions followed by 
discussion among the participants were, like focus groups, participant-centred (Puchta & 
Potter, 2002).  Internet data were collected either as part of a non-synchronous (i.e. not ‘real 
time’) web-based support group chatline, or via one-to-one emails.    
 
Face-to-face group members were recruited by first telephoning contacts for local ME support 
groups, then writing to their organizing committees and via them to individual members. The 
letters explained the purpose of the study and stated that all data would be made anonymous 
and treated as confidential.  One meeting was held at JG’s house; the second meeting was 
held immediately after a support group session in a hospital seminar room.  The purpose of 
the research was discussed with participants, and they were informed that they could 
withdraw from the study at any time.  A total of 7 participants were recruited in this way.  
Each meeting lasted approximately one hour.  The data were recorded and transcribed using a 
modified version of the widely-used system developed by Jefferson (summarized by ten 
Have, 1999). 
 
Internet respondents were recruited through a message posted on a web-based support group, 
providing the same information as described above.  Members of the internet support group 
received all emails posted to the chatline; therefore their responses to the research questions 
were available for other members to read and comment on.  This is referred to here as 
‘Internet Chatline Communication’ (ICC), and 38 sufferers chose to respond on this basis.  
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However, support group members were asked if they would prefer to communicate on a one-
to-one basis so that responses would be private.  This communication is referred to here as 
‘Internet Personal Communication’ (IPC), and it involved a further 11 respondents.  In the 
analysis below, the extracts are coded to indicate their source.   All of the internet data are 
quoted with spelling, punctuation and all other features as in the original.   
 
In our efforts to focus on participants’ concerns rather than impose our own, all were asked a 
series of open, general and non-directive questions about their illness, how it affected them 
and how they dealt with it.   This analysis focuses on the responses to questions in which 
participants were asked to describe ME and its impact on their lives. 
 
Analytic procedure 
Our methods are rooted in the theoretical assumptions that language has a social function and 
is a medium of social action (Edwards, 1977).  Analysis therefore focuses on how it is that 
descriptions of ME are constructed, and the functions that such constructions might serve.  
We adopted the variety of discourse analysis developed in the context of discursive 
psychology and which draws on insights from conversation analysis (see Wooffitt, 2005) 
because it is best fitted to our aims and the kind of data we had collected.  
 
The term ‘discursive psychology’ was introduced in 1992 (Edwards & Potter, 1992) and 
originally indicated an emphasis on construction and the analysis of variability in talk. More 
recently, discursive psychology has laid a greater emphasis on the analysis of conversations 
(Edwards, 2000; Potter & Hepburn, 2003). Discursive psychology treats psychology as itself 
an object in interaction, and views psychology as a part of discourse. (Potter, 2005).  One key 
element in discursive psychology is that participants’ psychological concerns and 
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categorizations are a topic of study only when they are embedded in interaction. In particular, 
discursive psychology is interested in understanding the way in which speakers construct 
agency and accountability in what they say. 
 
Discursive psychology developed from a particular interest in naturally-occurring, everyday 
interactions.  Our data were gathered for the specific purpose of examining sufferer’s 
descriptions of ME, by means of focus groups and one-to-one interviews.  Attempts were 
made, however, to focus on participants’ concerns, for example, by using open and general 
questions, and thereafter refraining from directing the topic of ongoing discussion.  Face-to-
face group discussions provide a rich context in which participants respond to each other as 
well as the interviewer, and many features of everyday conversation are present.  Email text, 
however, lacks certain features of oral communication such as pauses, turn-taking and self-
repair.  
     
Focus group methodology must be treated carefully within a discursive psychology 
framework (Edwards & Stokoe, 2004).  Kitzinger (1994; 1995) has noted that a key 
advantage of using focus groups to gather data is that participants interact.  This allows the 
turn-by-turn analysis of talk, to see how it is that speakers take up what has just been said, and 
how their response in turn shapes what might come next.  Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) refer 
to this as ‘next turn proof procedure’.  There is far less potential for such analysis in one-to-
one interviews, where participants’ turns are extended and interaction is minimal.  These data 
can still, however, be examined for conversational devices that have been identified by 
previous researchers working in the tradition of discursive psychology, and examined for the 
possible functions they might have. For example, descriptions which are carefully designed to 
allow inferences to be drawn from them are potentially observable in written as well as verbal 
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communication.  Therefore, we treated data extracts as equivalent for the purposes of 
analysis.  So our analysis was driven by an interest in the construction and function of 
accounts and not by a primary concern to identify differences in types of data (though we will 
discuss similarities and differences later). 
 
With this in mind, the analytic process was as follows.  First, transcripts were read through 
and inspected closely to identify recurrent patterns or features in the data.  Preliminary 
collections of particular discursive phenomena were then compiled.  These seemed to relate to 
constructions of ME as serious, enigmatic and not psychological.  Next, the analysis of these 
broadly identified constructions was facilitated by what Edwards (1997) refers to as the 
‘could-have-been-otherwise’ quality of talk.  This means that every detail of what is said or 
written is treated as potentially significant because it was said or written in that particular way 
and at that particular time.  In addition, the analysis was guided by three action-oriented 
properties of talk.  First to identify the action(s) being accomplished.  Second to relate the 
actions identified back to the text to see that participants did indeed orient to the action(s) as 
described by the analyst.  Third, to see how the detail of what was said produced the action(s) 
in question.  In the analysis that follows, we identify and explicate devices that were used to 
build and warrant various constructions of ME and the actions accomplished. 
 
Analysis 
1.  Constructions of ME as a serious illness 
In the following extract, Billy responds to the question ‘how would you describe having ME 
to someone who doesn't know anything about it?’  Of course, the local context in which this 
question is posed is one in which Billy is being invited by the interviewer to provide a 
description of ME.  However, the analytic point of interest here is to examine the way in 
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which Billy produces this description and the social actions to which this description orients.  
  
Extract 1  MEICCp58 Billy 
 30 […] The alcohol intolerance. (you look to others like you're a  
 31 chronic alcoholic and you haven't had, or desired, a drink in six  
 32 months). The IBS [Irritable Bowel Syndrome]. The memory loss.  
 33 Concentration gone. Can't absorb anything read. Emotional IQ  
 34 completely zeroed out. Fuzzy vision - it looks as if you're looking at a  
 35 two-dimensional screen, the 3D effect goes and the focus is difficult.   
 36 Vertigo or giddiness - things don't look steady. Odd attacks of  
 37 unaccountable backache or joint pain that may last days, weeks, then  
 38 just go. Can't get to sleep normally; wake up much too early in the 
 39 morning, so feel tired as a consequence. Night sweats. Muscles that  
40 ache or hurt after minor exercise, like turning the car.  
41  
 
An initial observation is that Billy’s description of ME allows the recipient to infer an 
assessment of the condition rather than stating it directly (as in ‘it’s awful because …’).  
Moreover, his description has several further interesting features.  First, it has a list-like 
quality; that is, instead of describing one or two primary characteristics of his condition (such 
as extreme tiredness), he describes a number of symptoms and he does so using minimal 
phrases (for example, ‘Concentration gone’ rather than ‘My concentration is gone’).  Second, 
he uses an analogy (‘it looks as if you’re looking at a two-dimensional screen’) to describe the 
impact of one symptom (‘fuzzy vision’).  Third, he produces an example of an effect 
(‘muscles that ache or hurt’) and a cause (‘turning the car’) that are clearly disjunctive.  We 
will explore each of these features in turn. 
 
We noted above that Billy used listing as a device for constructing ME.  A similar device can 
be observed in the following extracts.  Moreover, like Billy, respondents in extracts 2 and 3 
produce indirect assessments in response to the question.   
 
Extract 2 MEICCp17 Alex 
   1 My sleep pattern has gone out of the window. 
   2 
   3 My muscles ache. 
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   4 
   5 I'm not tired, I'm exhausted yet I haven't moved off the sofa. 
   6 
   7 I get 5 or 6 different types of headache. 
   8 
   9 My vision has deteriorated very quickly. 
 10 
 11 I start to talk and forget .... in mid sentence. 
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13 Oh, I must not forget I suffer from IBS [Irritable Bowel Syndrome]. 
 
 
 Extract 3 FGME2 
   1 Jennifer:   ↑how <would you describe> having ME to someone who  
   2   doesn't know anything about it? 
   3 Rhona:  hhh unbelievable= 
   4      Liz:  =aye 
   5 Rhona:   e::m tiredness (..) <you get ↑switched off> 
   6 Liz:  °aye° 
   7 Rhona:  you can be sitting (.) no [not] even doing anything=  
   8 Jennifer: =mm= 
   9 Rhona:  =and it's like somebody (..) switches you ↓off and you  
 10   have ↓got to lie down (..) or you you fall asleep [unclear] 
 11 Liz:   °your brain doesnae work properly either°  
 12 Jennifer: mhmm= 
 13 Rhona:  =fuzzy head 
 14 Liz:  °aye° 
 15 Rhona:   muscle and (.) joint pain  
 
We have already noted how Billy uses  minimal phrases and sentences that lack part of a verb 
or a pronoun to ‘do a list’.  For example, ‘Concentration gone. Can't absorb anything read. 
Emotional IQ completely zeroed out’ (lines 33-34). In extract 2, Alex leaves a blank line 
between each symptom description, so that his account of ME gives the visual impression of a 
list.  In extract 3, which comes from a face-to-face group rather than internet communication 
(as extracts 1 and 2), we see how participants collaborate to work up a listing. For example, in 
lines 5-9 Rhona says ‘tiredness (..) you get switched off …’, and Liz follows with ‘your brain 
doesnae work properly either’ (line 11).  Indeed, by the end of the list, they employ minimal 
descriptions (‘fuzzy head’; ‘muscle and joint pain.’), which are similar to those we observed 
in the internet extracts.  Moreover, they use them to similar effect, namely making their 
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description hearable as a list.   
 
The lists produced make relevant a range of characteristics: concentration and memory 
problems, visual problems, IBS, muscular and joint pain, headaches and tiredness.  They 
thereby allow the recipient to infer that the effects of ME are extensive. 
 
A second feature of Billy’s (extract 1) description that we noted was his use of analogy. A 
similar device can be seen in the next three extracts.  As was the case with the earlier extracts, 
the following three responses are produced by participants in reply to a question, ‘how would 
you describe having ME to someone who doesn’t know anything about it?’.  Once again the 
analytic point of interest here is the way in which sufferers’ descriptions are constructed here-
and-now given the potential range of ways that they could have answered the question.  In the 
following three descriptions participants accomplish an answer to the question through 
analogy, and as in extracts 1 to 3, they thereby produce an indirect assessment of their 
condition.  
 
 Extract 4 FGME1 
   3 Mandy: there ↑is a definition that I've read of the (.) ME Action if  
   4   you i↑mag↓ine (.) that you've got (.)↑severe 'flu (.)  
   5 Claire:  mhmm 
   6 Mandy  you've got a hangover (.)  
   7 Jennifer:  mhmm= 
   8 Mandy  =so you've got the tummy and the head  
   9 Jennifer:  yeah= 
 10 Mandy  =and all the 'flu aches and pains (.) and then (.) if you  
 11   imagine you've just run a marathon (.)  
 12 Jennifer:  mhmm 
 13 Mandy  you <↑put all those together> and you have ME 
 
 Extract 5 MEICCp1 Lynn 
4 Remember your worst flu virus you had,now run a marathon,on top of   
5 that you have a migrain,feel dizzy,hurt from head to toe.Try to play  
 6 chessblindfolded,and havent slept for a week.Wake up feeling ok,,,,15  
 7 minutes later are unable to even get out of bed with out help,every  
 8 muscleand joint feels like its on fire,and suddely find out you become  
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 9 dyxlexic, Im sure there are other things ive forgotten. 
 
 Extract 6 MEICCp1 Emily 
   9 I usually tell my friends that I feel like I have been out all night 
 10 drinking pints of vodka & tequilla slammers and then forced to run a 
11 marathon on top of a dose of flu. 
 
 
In extracts 4 to 6 participants respond to the question of what it is like to have ME by 
producing a set of activities or experiences which we are told are analogous to having ME.  
There are several interesting features of the way these analogies are constructed.  First, they 
invite the reader or listener to imagine a particular state of affairs: ‘if you imagine (.) that 
you’ve got (.) severe ‘flu’;  ‘if you imagine you’ve just run a marathon’ (extract  4, lines 4, 
10-11).  The respondent in extract 5 invites the reader to remember, rather than imagine, ‘your 
worst flu virus you had’ (line 4).  The things they invite the recipient to imagine include 
having flu, having hangovers, and running marathons.  It is therefore implied that these are 
potentially imaginable states of affairs for the reader or listener. 
 
A second point is that respondents build their descriptions to portray exaggerated or severe 
cases of these imaginable experiences.  So, for example, we are invited to imagine ‘severe flu’ 
(extract 4, line 4), or to remember the ‘worst flu virus’ (extract 5, line 4) and we are invited to 
imagine running a marathon or climbing Everest, and not exercise that might be assumed to 
be more commonplace, such as going running, taking exercise or climbing a hill.  Similarly, 
in extract 6 Emily likens her feelings to being out ‘all night’ and the alcohol intake, the effects 
of which her friends are invited to imagine, is extreme.  She describes drinking a mixture of 
strong spirits (vodka and tequila) by the pint. Pomerantz (1984) has shown that extreme case 
formulations, such as ‘worst flu virus’, or ‘all night’ can be used to provide the strongest 
possible case for what is being said, in anticipation of a potentially cynical uptake. 
 
 17 
Another way in which participants work up extreme or exaggerated forms of the experiences 
to which they refer is by juxtaposing them.  In extract 4, Mandy has invited the listener to 
imagine ‘you’ve got (.) severe flu … you’ve got a hangover … you’ve just run a marathon. ‘  
She then says ‘you put all those together and you have ME’.  In extract 5, the reader is invited 
to think about having ‘flu ‘now run a marathon,on top of that you have a migrain,feel 
dizzy,hurt from head to toe.’  Again, her description makes relevant the concurrence of 
difficult or unpleasant states of affairs.  Emily implies the juxtaposition of having a hangover, 
and being ‘forced to run a marathon on top of a dose of flu.’  
 
So far, we have noted that participants employ analogies in their descriptions of ME.  In using 
these analogies, they appeal to readers’ or listeners’ experiences, or imaginable states of 
affairs.  At the same time, we have observed the use of several descriptive devices through 
which respondents portray extreme or exaggerated forms of these imaginable experiences.  In 
this way, respondents are able to invite empathy (by drawing on potentially common 
experiences) while simultaneously portraying the severity of ME.  
 
A third feature of extract 1 we noted above was the way Billy’s description of an effect of ME 
(‘muscles that ache or hurt’) was apparently unwarranted by the attributed cause (‘turning the 
car’).  A similar descriptive device is employed in the following extracts.   
 
 Extract 7 MEIPCp2 Dorothy 
 24 Holding a pen or a book become thing to be proud of ;-) 
 25 Reading becomes something you can do only in short stints. Walking   
26 becomes a trial. 
 
 Extract 8 MEICCp13 Lesley 
   57 standing is one of the most dangerous things one can do.  
    
 
 Extract 9 FGME2 
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 816 Rhona  if I ↑stand for long ↑peri↓ods (.) <I don't know about  
 817   you> 
 818 Liz:  °terrible° 
 819 Rhona:  that ↑kills↓you 
 820 Liz:   terrible  
 
In these extracts participants describe an activity which they then claim is in some way 
challenging, for example, ‘Holding a pen or a book’ and ‘reading’ (extract 7), ‘standing’ 
(extract 8), and ‘stand[ing] for long periods’ (extract 9).  The kinds of activities they describe 
are mundane, ordinary activities, the sorts of things that everybody might do, and the kinds of 
activities that are physically relatively undemanding. 
 
They then produce an assessment of that activity.  So, holding a pen or book is described as 
‘[a] thing to be proud of’ (extract 7), walking is ‘a trial’ (extract 7) and standing is ‘one of the 
most dangerous things one can do’ (extract 8).  In extract 9, participants collaborate to 
produce their assessment of standing as very difficult.  In line 818, Liz evaluates standing for 
long periods as ‘terrible’, while Rhona's comment is ‘that kills you’ (line 819) and Liz affirms 
that assessment by saying ‘terrible’ again.  These assessments emphasise the exceptional 
nature (pride in holding a pen) or exceptional difficulty in carrying out the mundane activities 
made relevant.  There is therefore a disjunction between the activity and efforts necessary to 
achieve it: the difficulty or pride is not merited by the activity described.  In other words, 
participants make an implicit contrast between the difficulties they have, and the kinds of 
straightforward, physically undemanding tasks that give rise to these difficulties.   
 
A further notable feature of participants' descriptions relates to their use of pronouns.  In eight 
of the ten extracts examined above, participants used the second person plural when 
describing what it is like to have ME.  For example, in extract 3, Rhona states ‘you can be 
sitting [...] and it's like somebody switches you off or you fall asleep’ and Liz claims ‘your 
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brain doesnae work properly either’ (lines 5-11).  Similarly, in extract 4 (line 3 onwards) the 
recipient is invited to imagine ‘that you've got (.) severe 'flu (.) [...] you've got a hangover’ 
and so on.  The use of ‘you’ rather than the apparently more appropriate pronoun ‘I’ has the 
effect of implying generality of symptoms.  That is, it is inferred that these symptoms 
characterize ME in general, they are not specific to the individual describing them.  In this 
way, respondents avoid personalizing their accounts.   
 
A related observation is that in extract 1, Billy omits a pronoun altogether even though he is 
describing symptoms that are quite specific and so might reasonably be considered to relate to 
personal experience. He writes ‘[c]an't get to sleep normally; wake up much too early in the 
morning, […]  Night sweats.’ (lines 38-40).  In other places, Billy makes repeated use of the 
definite article where it would usually be left out - ‘[t]he alcohol intolerance’ (line 30); ‘[t]he 
IBS’ (line 32); ‘[t]he memory loss’ (line 32).  Again, the effect is to suggest that these are 
symptoms that are generally associated with ME.  
 
There is an interesting exception to this pattern.  In extract 9 above, Rhona uses the first 
person singular pronoun.  She says ‘if I stand for long periods’ (lines 816-819).  But there 
follows a short pause, and an insertion clause in which she explicitly seeks some sort of 
collaboration regarding the effects of standing - ‘I don't know about you.’  Liz takes this up as 
an invitation to provide an assessment, but does so selectively, in that she does not refer to her 
own experience.  Instead, she uses no pronoun at all: ‘terrible.’  Similarly, in Rhona's turn that 
follows, her claim is general rather than personal: ‘that kills you.’  In this case then, initial 
first person is changed and participants use the pronoun ‘you ‘ to suggest general features of 
ME and to avoid suggesting an individual, or psychological, basis for ME. 
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2.  Constructions of ME as an enigmatic illness 
There is a further feature of the extracts above that we wish to examine;  in particular the 
ways respondents build up the condition as puzzling in one or both of two ways.  One is 
through the use of terms such as ‘odd’, and the other is through the use of contrasting states of 
affairs. 
 
 Extract 10 MEICCp26 George 
3 You feel profoundly tired physically and mentally for no good reason.    
4 You get odd aches and pains 
 
Extract 11 (also 5) MEICCp1 Lynn  (for ease of reference, the original  
                                                            extract  number appears in brackets) 
 6 Wake up feeling ok,,,,15  
 7 minutes later are unable to even get out of bed with out help 
 
 Extract 12 (also 2) MEICCp17 Alex 
 5 I'm not tired, I'm exhausted yet I haven't moved off the sofa. 
 
Extract 13 (also 1) MEICCp58 Billy 
  
 36 Vertigo or giddiness - things don't look steady. Odd attacks of  
 37 unaccountable backache or joint pain that may last days, weeks, then  
 38 just go.  
 
 Extract 14 (also 3) FGME2 
   7 Rhona:  you can be sitting (.) no [not] even doing anything=  
   8 Jennifer: mm= 
   9 Rhona  =and it's like somebody (..) switches you ↓off and you  
 10   have ↓got to lie down (..) or you you fall asleep [unclear] 
 11 Liz:   °your brain doesnae work properly either°  
 [...] 
 29  Liz:    em (.) it's just a weird weird thing <it's no> [not] one thing  
 30   and <it's no [not] one thing> (..) two days in a row  
   
 
In extract 10, George writes that ‘[y]ou get odd aches and pains (line 4; emphasis added) and 
in extract 13, Billy writes about ‘[o]dd attacks of unaccountable backache or joint pain’ (lines 
36-38; emphasis added). In extract 14, Liz makes the claim ‘em (.) it's just a weird weird 
thing’ (emphasis added).  In this way, they are able to introduce unpleasant symptoms and 
simultaneously suggest that they are inexplicable; in other words, it is implied that they do not 
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have a specifiable precursor. Liz reinforces her characterisation of ME as ‘weird’ by implying 
that its symptoms are unpredictable from day to day (‘it's no one thing and it's no one thing 
(..) two days in a row’ (lines 29-30). 
 
A second observation concerns the use of contrasts.  For example, Lynn uses the following 
contrast formulation: ‘[w]ake up feeling ok,,,,[sic]15 minutes later are unable to even get out 
of bed with out help’ (extract 11, lines 6-7).  In extract 12, Alex writes ‘I'm not tired, I'm 
exhausted yet I haven't moved off the sofa’ (line 5). Similarly, in extract 14, Rhona contrasts 
‘sitting (.) no even doing anything [...]’ with ‘it's like somebody (..) switches you off and you 
have got to lie down’ (lines 7-10).  In each case, one state of affairs (feeling OK, being on the 
sofa, sitting not doing anything) is contrasted with another state of affairs characterised as 
debilitating (being unable to get out of bed on one’s own, feeling exhausted, having to lie 
down).  These descriptions are designed to allow the recipient to draw certain inferences; in 
particular these are not accidental conjunctions, instead there is portrayed an unexpected 
relation between the two states of affairs.  That is, Lynn conjoins ‘wake up feeling ok’ with 
her state ‘15 minutes later’; Alex signals the contrast between his previous state of inactivity 
and the exhaustion that he reports with the term ‘yet’.  Rhona characterises the change from 
‘doing nothing’ to ‘having to lie down’ as abrupt through the use of the simile ‘somebody 
switches you off’.  
 
These descriptive devices portray the symptoms attributed to ME as puzzling and imply that 
there is no rational basis for the problems sufferers claim to experience. This is made more 
explicit in George’s description, ‘you feel profoundly tired physically and mentally for no 
good reason’ (emphasis added) and in Billy’s characterisation of backache as ‘unaccountable’ 
and something that after days or weeks ‘then just go[es] ‘ (which draws attention to the lack 
 22 
of imputed reason for their disappearance).  In addition, by constructing the basis of 
symptoms as irrational, participants are also able to make available the inference that it is not 
something they have done that has led to the debilitating effects they describe.  This can be 
inferred from the nature of activities to which they refer (not moving off the sofa or not even 
doing anything) and in Rhona’s characterisation of somebody switching her off. Through 
passive inactivity and attributing switching off to external agency, participants imply that they 
are not personally accountable for their fatigue. 
 
3.  Constructions of ME as 'not psychological' 
In the following extracts, participants produce and deny claims about what ME is not.  In 
extracts 15 and 16 respondents claim that ME is not depression, and in 17 that it is not 
laziness.  These extracts occurred at various points in the transcripts and were not generated in 
immediate response to a particular question. 
 
 Extract 15 FGME2 
 475 Liz:  a:nd I mean before I ↑went to the doctor (.) the last  
 476   time before I was ( ) diagnosed or ( ) <she agreed with  
 477   me> ( ) I did say to <my husband> ‘look (..) do ↑you think  
 478   it's depression or do you think there's something wrong  
 479   with me ( ) do you think (.) I'm <just making it> all ↑up or  
 480   whatever’ he says <‘no’ he says> ‘I live with you day to  
 481   day and (.) and ↑I know there is definitely something (.)  
 482   ↓wrong’ 
 483 Jennifer:  mm= 
 484 Liz  =<it's no [not] depression> I actually (.) suffered from   
485 depression (.) years ago (.) a:nd so I knew it wasnae    
486 [wasn't] depression  
 
 Extract 16 MEIPCp7 Dorothy 
 29 I called my husbaband into the Drs surgery and told him in front of the  
 30 Dr what his dx [diagnosis] was. My husband laughed and said that  
 31 there was no way I was depressed and that as his field of work was  
 32 mental health he reckoned that he might have spotted the signs in his  
 33 wife were they present.  
 
 Extract 17 FGME2 
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680 Liz  there was just= 
681 Jennifer mm= 
682 Liz  nothing right about me and (.) I couldnae [couldn’t] 
683 understand this wanting to sleep all the time (.) I’ve never 
684 been late going to bed (..) but to go to bed during the day or fall 
685 asleep in a ↑chair 
686 Jennifer [mmhmm 
687 Rhona  mhmm] 
688 Liz  ↓never (..) never (.) ehm (.…) and no [not] to ° ‘oh I cannae 
689 Liz:  be bothered’° when you ↑say ‘cannae be ↑both↑ered’ (.) it  
 690   sounds as if (.) <to me> ↑lazy  
 691 Rhona:  °aye° 
 692 Jennifer: mhmm 
 693 Rhona:  yeah 
 694 Liz:  <it it's> (..) you know it's ↑no [not] lazy it's (..) you just ( )  
 695   ↑havenae got the energy to ↑do it .h (.) and that's what you  
696 say <‘oh I cannae [can't] be bothered doing that’> but it (.)   
697 it's ↑no [not] that it's (.) you haven't got the energy to get  
 698   yourself ↑up out the chair (.) to ↑do ↓it (.) and (..) you just  
 699   cannae [can't] fathom out what what's going ↑on 
 
In the first part of these extracts, participants make relevant a potential diagnosis.  Dorothy 
(extract 16) states indirectly that her condition may be seen as depression by giving an 
account of her husband’s receipt of the doctor’s diagnosis (line 31).  By contrast Liz (extract 
15) introduces this description of her condition directly via reported speech (‘I did say to my 
husband ‘look (..) do you think it’s depression …’ ‘).  Liz describes one circumstance under 
which you might say ‘I cannae be bothered’ and states that this might be ascribed to laziness 
(‘it sounds as if (.) to me lazy’).   
 
However, each participant then denies the potential diagnosis she has just produced.  Liz 
produces the counterclaims ‘it’s no depression’ (line 484) and (line 694) ‘ ‘it’s no lazy’, while 
Dorothy quotes her husband who, she claims, said ‘there was no way I was depressed’ (line 
31). Indeed, her account of his denial is preceeded by the claim ‘[m]y husband laughed’.  
Laughter is a surprising reaction to a being told of a partner's depression, and this description 
implies that such a diagnosis is not only wrong but risible.   
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These denials employ a number of devices to build the factual status of the counterclaim.  For 
example, Liz and Dorothy make relevant their husbands as witness to their condition.  Potter 
(1996) notes the usefulness of providing corroboration in rendering an account factual.  
Moreover, that they introduce ‘husband’ as corroborating their account further strengthens 
their claims.  That is, Whalen and Zimmerman (1990) among others have noted that category 
entitlement can be used to warrant claims to knowledge, and in this case, someone in the 
category of a husband, could be assumed to have detailed knowledge of his wife’s mental 
state.  Indeed, Liz makes explicitly relevant her husband’s close relationship with her: ‘I live 
with you day to day (.) and I know there is definitely something wrong’ (lines 480-482).  
Dorothy refers three times to their relationship as a married couple, referring to ‘husband’ 
twice and ‘the signs in his wife’ (lines 32-33; emphasis added). Dorothy’s account is 
particularly effective: she produces a second relevant category description of her husband, 
writing that ‘his field of work was mental health.’  The categorical claims are designed to 
make available certain inferences, which are made explicit here: ‘he reckoned that he might 
have spotted the signs in his wife were they present.’  Thus, the husband's credentials as a 
person with knowledge of depression, and as someone who has a close relationship with 
Dorothy, are used to expose the doctor's diagnosis of depression as inaccurate. 
 
It is worth noting that these statements about the respondent’s condition are portrayed as 
husbands’ observations.  That is, Liz’s account in extract 15 is produced in such a way that 
her question (‘I did say to my husband ‘look (..) do you think it's depression or …’) and his 
counterclaim (‘no … I live with you … and I know there is definitely something (.) wrong.’)  
can be heard as reported speech (lines 477-479). Dorothy, in extract 17, uses indirect reported 
speech in lines 30-31 where she writes: ‘[m]y husband laughed and said that there was no way 
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I was depressed.’  In all these cases, participants are using ‘active voicing’. Wooffitt (1992) 
has shown that active voicing is used to construct the reality of the reported speech.  Thus, 
when Liz quotes her husband, the account appears more convincing than if she had merely 
summarized what he had said in her own words. 
 
In extract 17, Liz uses a further device, specifically an appearance/reality formulation, to 
construct her incapacity as due to lack of energy rather than laziness.  Potter & Wetherell 
(1989) have shown how this formulation can help to construct the reality of what is being 
claimed.  It involves setting up a version as the one that may appear to be obvious, then 
undermining it by producing the version that is 'real'.  Here, Liz makes the following contrast: 
she says ‘when you say ‘cannae be bothered’ (.) it sounds as if (.) to me lazy [...] it it's (..) you 
know it's no lazy it's (..) you just havenae got the energy to do it’ (lines 689-695).  The 
appearance of ME is constructed as one in which the sufferer lacks the motivation to do 
something.  With ‘it sounds as if’, Liz orients to the interpretation that others might have of 
ME sufferers' inactivity.  Immediately after this, there is what seems to be a repair.  That is, 
we might expect in the context something like ‘it sounds as if you're being lazy.’  What Liz 
does is to pause briefly then say ‘to me lazy.’  She therefore actively positions herself as a 
person who understands this assumption of a lack of motivation.  This works to construct Liz 
herself as impartial, making the same initial assumptions that any other observer might have 
done.  In turn, this construction helps to strengthen the reality claim that follows.   
 
Discussion 
We mentioned earlier that previous discursive research focused on the ways that sufferers deal 
with particular problematic assumptions about ME including the ways that it is regarded as a 
psychological rather than a physical condition and that it is therefore somehow ‘not real’:  it is 
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just tiredness, laziness or, as one study found, ‘masked depression’ (Horton-Salway, 2004).  
Our work complements and extends these findings by showing how various constructions of 
ME are designed to address further possibly damaging implications for the sufferer of 
claiming to have ME/CFS.  
 
In the first section of the analysis, we identified several descriptive devices, which, we 
argued, worked to build the seriousness of ME in various ways.  These included, first, listing 
which was used to portray ME as an accumulation of symptoms, and to claim an extensive 
range of problems. Second, vivid analogy with everyday experiences that cause debilitating 
tiredness (e.g. having the ‘flu or running a marathon), was used to imply the severe impact of 
the illness.  Third, by comparing ME symptoms to extreme forms of more everyday 
experiences, participants orient to the potential charge that their fatigue is similar to the kinds 
of tiredness commonly felt by other people, and is therefore not a serious condition.  Their 
invitation to recipients to imagine these experiences functioned to evoke empathy. Fourth, 
participants produced an implicit contrast between mundane activities and the assessment of 
difficulty in doing them, which further constructed their physical condition as serious.  These 
descriptions enabled sufferers to deflect the potential charge that their illness was brought on 
by their previous levels of activity.  This in turn can be seen as an orientation to the possible 
interpretation of ME as an illness of 'high achievers', brought on by an unusually active and 
demanding lifestyle (see also Horton-Salway, 2001, who makes a similar observation).  
 
Finally, we observed a preference for the second person plural and noted that its use helps to 
avoid personalizing sufferers’ experiences, because it allows the recipient to infer that what is 
said is generally applicable.  Bülow and Hydén (2003: 238) also showed that personal 
experiences were avoided, in part due to ‘a general assumption that personal stories about 
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suffering do not belong in medical discourse’. Indeed, Åsbring and Närvänen (2003) showed 
that physicians in their study regarded symptoms as not serious (they can be lived with), they 
sometimes questioned patients’ morality (especially their work ethic), and categorized them 
as ambitious, active, illness-fixated and so on.  The orientation of sufferers to the issues we 
have identified is therefore not surprising. 
 
In the second section, we showed how participants used several linguistic devices (descriptive 
terms and contrast) to portray their illness as enigmatic and to imply the non-rational and 
unpredictable status of their symptoms. This allowed them to emphasise their passive role in 
developing symptoms, and implied that they were not responsible for developing ME/CFS. 
So, whereas Tucker (2004) showed how issues of responsibility and blame were dealt with 
through constructions of ME as an organic illness, our analysis reveals a further way of 
dealing with issues of accountability. 
 
In the third part, we showed how participants’ accounts were designed to warrant what 
ME/CFS is not.  Corroboration, category entitlements, appearance/reality formulations (Potter 
and Wetherell, 1989) and active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992) of 'reliable witness' testimony were 
used to build the factual status of their claims that ME/CFS is not laziness nor is it depression.  
By making relevant and then denying these meanings of ME/CFS, participants were better 
able to orient to and then reject explicitly the kinds of assumptions that are made about the 
illness. Horton-Salway (2001) and Tucker (2004) note sufferers’ use of similar devices 
(corroboration and active voicing) to claim their illness is physical, and reject its assumed 
status as psychological.   
 
Our concern in this paper was not to categorise the nature of respondents’ beliefs regarding 
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the causes or explanations for having ME, but simply to analyse accounts of the experience of 
having ME.  In particular, our analysis focused on the functions accomplished through the 
details of the descriptions produced by participants.  We showed how their accounts were 
designed to address negative or otherwise problematic inferences that may be made about 
them.   This is important because the rhetorical and interactive nature of illness accounts has 
been ignored in cognitive behavioural (Horton-Salway, 2001) and other approaches to 
treatment.  ME sufferers' descriptions of their illness have been taken at face value as 
evidence for theoretical interpretations of the cause of this condition or, according to Horton-
Salway (2001), as evidence of their attributions or personality.  Thus, sufferers' apparent pre-
occupation with its seriousness, or its enigmatic nature, has been used to support the use of 
CBT to change 'dysfunctional' beliefs (Wessely, 1996).  Sufferers' accounts might, however, 
stress the seriousness and mysterious nature of ME * to counter claims that it is not a 
legitimate, physical illness.  In other words, the kinds of assumptions built into common 
treatments for ME/CFS are just those that participants reject.  Thus, it is not enough to treat 
sufferers’ descriptions as ‘mere reflections’ of experience. They must be understood in the 
context of the inferential and interactional issues they are designed to address. It is therefore 
important to understand patients’ versions, and how they are built, because effective treatment 
requires the doctor to work with patients’ descriptions of their experiences rather than 
imposing their own (cf. Clements et al, 1997).   
 
Our findings are therefore in line with but extend those of previous studies.  This is significant 
because, as we explained earlier, one of our primary aims was to compare data from different 
sources in order to assess the utility of the internet as a research tool.  So, in this study data 
were collected from two sources: face-to-face group discussions among members of a support 
group and questions answered via an internet chatroom and personal emails. In the analysis, 
 29 
we made no prior distinction between data from different sources. Instead, we let any 
similarities and differences emerge through our subsequent inspection of our analytic 
findings. Let us now, then, assess the use of these different methods. 
 
We have observed that the devices and interactional concerns identified were manifest in both 
internet and face-to-face group data.  For example, we found the use of listing, vivid 
description and analogy, and reference to a ‘reliable witness’ in both types of data. Of course, 
there were some minor differences in the details of production due to the different media. In 
the face-to-face group, listing was accomplished collaboratively within sequences of turns.  
By contrast, in the internet data, line breaks and grammatical omissions were used to create 
lists.  There was also an absence of pauses, hesitancy markers and so on in the written 
communication. 
 
Moreover, the themes that emerged were similar, suggesting that participants were attending 
to the same kinds of interactional concerns. In one sense, this is perhaps not surprising.  Most 
of the email correspondence was done via a chatline in which correspondents’ responses were 
simultaneously emailed to other members of the group and even the personal emails were 
addressed to another person (the first author).  Therefore, all the data were provided in a 
context of some level of social interaction and the fact that we have observed participants 
addressing the inferential implications of their accounts indicates that they were sensitive to 
this context.   
 
The internet is therefore a fruitful means of collecting data which has further practical 
advantages for research with people who suffer debilitating fatigue amongst other problems.  
Moreover, by using computer-aided communication, access could be had to people over a 
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wide geographic area, some of whom may be housebound and might not otherwise have been 
able to participate in research (or in support groups).  
 
Previous studies have not attended to the internet as a domain for interactions and support 
among sufferers.  This study goes some way to remedying this omission. This is important 
because sufferers often experience reduced opportunities for everyday social interactions. In 
extreme cases, the severity of the problem may even mean that sufferers are denied the 
opportunity to attend face-to-face peer group support meetings or to engage fully with 
therapeutic services.  In this sense, sufferers are faced with problems of social exclusion from 
the very groups and services which in principle could provide them with support. 
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